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The international financial crisis was followed by waves of domestic regulatory reforms, first and foremost, in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Post-crisis financial regulation was sometimes different across jurisdictions. Moreover, the US and the EU sought in various ways to (re)assert their regulatory power not only vis-à-vis the market, but also with regard to other jurisdictions, which often resisted the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders. Consequently, a handful of important post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes emerged concerning EU rules on hedge funds, US rules on bank structure and EU and US rules on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. These disputes mainly involved the terms of access to each other’s markets, the equivalence between domestic rules, and the extraterritorial effects of those rules.  Some of these disputes were also intra-EU disagreements, whenever the preferences of the United Kingdom (UK) were different from those of Continental countries and similar to those of the US. The network structure of the financial industry and the patterns of financial interdependence across the Atlantic amplified the extra territorial effects of domestic reforms, but at the same time triggered an active involvement of the transnational financial industry in the management and, eventually, the settlement of these disputes.
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1 Introduction

The international financial crisis highlighted the risk posed by a financial system that was not properly regulated. Afterward, new financial regulation was adopted at the international, regional, and national levels with a view to reducing financial risk. In very few cases, such as capital and liquidity requirements for banks, new detailed international standards - the Basel III accord​[1]​ - were set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),​[2]​ but the implementation of this soft law was left to individual jurisdictions. In other cases, such as the regulation of hedge funds, “High Level Principles” were agreed by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),​[3]​ but the issuing of specific rules was the task of individual jurisdictions. Finally, in certain areas of financial regulation, such as bank structure, international standards were not set and the matter was left for individual jurisdictions to regulate.​[4]​ Consequently, the specific content of the post-crisis financial regulation was mainly determined at the national level, or the regional level in the case of the European Union (EU), whose rules to a large extent provide the framework for national regulatory changes in the member states. 

The United States (US) and the EU have very large financial sectors and are the main trading partners in financial services. From 2008 onwards, they have adopted a vast array of new financial rules. In the vast majority of cases, the transatlantic regulatory cooperation necessary to manage the cross-border effects of these rules was successful and was facilitated by the background work conducted by international and transnational regulatory fora.​[5]​ Nonetheless, the repeated interactions taking place in these fora and the soft rules they issued did not manage to prevent a handful of transatlantic regulatory disputes, which are defined as disagreements between the US and the EU about the content and/or scope of each other’s regulation. These disputes mainly concerned the terms of access to each other’s markets, the equivalence between domestic rules, and the extraterritorial effects of those rules.​[6]​ Some of these disputes were also intra-EU disagreements, whenever the preferences of the United Kingdom (UK) were different from those of Continental countries and similar to those of the US.​[7]​ This pattern of preference divergence between the UK and the EU will intensify after Brexit, following the outcome of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU in June 2016.  

Why did post-crisis regulatory disputes in finance emerge and how were they settled? The argument developed in this paper is twofold. Firstly, post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes emerged because domestic regulatory reforms were sometimes different across jurisdictions. Jurisdictions sought to (re)assert their regulatory power not only vis-à-vis the “market” (which was cross-border), but also vis-à-vis other jurisdictions, which often resisted the projection of regulatory power beyond national borders. Second, the network structure of the financial industry and the patterns of financial interdependence across the Atlantic amplified the extra territorial effects of domestic reforms, but at the same time triggered an active involvement of the transnational financial industry in the management and, eventually, the settlement of these disputes.

By developing this argument, this paper speaks to two main themes of the special issue: the Ostrom School on “polycentric governance” and the recent work on the international “network structure” of the financial industry.​[8]​ According to Ostrom, “polycentric governance” connotes “many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other” in a given system.​[9]​ In the polycentric governance of the international financial system, the US and the EU independently reformed their domestic financial regulation with a view to reducing financial risk after the crisis. However, the network structure of the financial industry made the post-crisis reform of financial regulation in one jurisdiction particularly challenging because domestic rules produced de jure or the facto effects in other jurisdictions, impinging upon their respective regulatory power. Sometimes jurisdictions deliberately engaged in regulatory “export”. The ensuing “regulatory clashes” between jurisdictions gave the transnational financial industry a strong incentive to mobilize in order to facilitate the resolution of cross-border (in this specific case, transatlantic) regulatory disputes that would disrupt the network. 

Three main caveats are in order. First, the paper sets out to contribute to the scholarly debate on the international political economy of financial regulation at the “systemic” level by adopting an analytical approach that encompasses multiple levels of governance and multiple arenas. Thus, it speaks to the body of scholarly works on the new interdependence​[10]​ and the power of the financial industry.​[11]​ For reasons of space limits, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine transatlantic cooperation and competition in international regulatory fora, such as the BCBS.​[12]​  Similarly, this paper does not delve into the domestic political and institutional factors​[13]​ that shaped domestic regulatory reforms – it does so only to the extent that this is necessary to account for the emergence and management of transatlantic disputes. In the following sections, the account is streamlined for reasons of space.  It is however important to bear in mind that often there were disagreements not only between jurisdictions, but also within jurisdictions, for example amongst domestic regulators,​[14]​ or within regulatory agencies.​[15]​

The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the literature on international regulatory cooperation and regulatory competition in finance and outlines the explanation developed in this paper. This is followed by a discussion of the main post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes that resulted from the adoption of new domestic financial regulation in the US and the EU. The disputes examined in this paper concerned, respectively, EU rules (hedge funds), US rules (bank structure) and EU and US rules (over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives). These disputes were important, given the large size of the financial services involved. Although some issues have not fully been resolved, the terms for their settlement are, by now, agreed.

2 The politics of international regulatory cooperation and competition in finance

The literature on the politics of international regulatory cooperation and competition in finance points out the “dilemma”​[16]​ between safeguarding financial stability domestically and protecting the competitiveness of the domestic financial industry internationally.​[17]​ On the one hand, jurisdictions have an incentive to engage in regulatory cooperation in order to protect financial stability. However, international regulatory cooperation has redistributive implications: it generates costs and benefits that are not uniformly distributed across jurisdictions.​[18]​ On the other hand, jurisdictions also have an incentive to engage in regulatory competition​[19]​ by providing market-friendly rules in order to attract business.  Jurisdictions seek to balance regulatory cooperation and competition by projecting their regulatory power beyond national borders. 

Consequently, jurisdictions engage in international standard-setting through transgovernmental financial regulatory fora with a view to setting in place rules that protect financial stability without excessively penalising their financial sector.​[20]​ However, international standards tend to be rather general​[21]​ because they have to be implemented by various (often very different) jurisdictions. Hence, the specific content of financial regulation is determined domestically, at least in the main jurisdictions. Moreover, international standards are not always set by transgovernamental fora.​[22]​ Sometimes, international standards are de facto set by leading financial jurisdictions, first and foremost the US and the EU, which adopt domestic legislation that is not really global in scope and enforcement. Yet, third-country firms and products must comply with US and EU rules in order to be able operate in those markets. ​[23]​ 

Jurisdictions engage in “redistributive cooperation”​[24]​ not only in international standard-setting fora, but also through bilateral relations. Indeed, jurisdictions can exert regulatory power beyond borders by adopting domestic rules that are “extraterritorial”; these rules affect directly or indirectly, and to a material extent, financial activities or entities in other jurisdictions.​[25]​ “Direct extraterritoriality” applies when even the “most inconsequential contact with a jurisdiction triggers its authority”.​[26]​ “Extraterritorial territoriality” applies when not only foreign companies are required to comply with the rules of the host jurisdiction, but also their parent companies.​[27]​ A similar concept is the “territorial extension”, whereby a jurisdiction governs activities or entities that are not centered upon its territory, with a view to influencing the nature and content of third-country rules.​[28]​ Jurisdictions generally adopt extra-territorial rules to regulate cross-border activities that partly take place on their territory or have substantial effects on it.

Direct or indirect extraterritoriality and divergent domestic regulation have the potential to trigger regulatory disputes between “financial great powers”,​[29]​ which are defined as jurisdictions with a large “domestic market” and “regulatory capacity”.​[30]​ The polycentric governance of the international financial system is centered on the “Euro American condominium”.​[31]​  Financial great powers, namely, the US and the EU, are reluctant to “adjust” their domestic regulation to foreign rules and are likely to resist an attempt by other jurisdictions to exert regulatory power beyond national borders. By contrast, small, third countries generally adjust their rules to those of large jurisdictions with whom they want to do business. However, it is problematic for third countries to comply with the domestic regulation of financial great powers if US and EU rules diverge and if they have extra-territorial effects. For example, OTC derivatives can only be cleared once, according to either US rules or to EU rules. 

How were post-crisis regulatory disputes in finance managed and eventually solved? The literature on the new interdependence​[32]​ explains the resolution of transatlantic regulatory disputes by drawing attention to the ability of “regulatory actors to develop transnational alliances” in order to reform domestic regulation and, eventually, global rules. Phil Cerny​[33]​ coined the term “transnational neopluralism”, pointing out the formation of powerful “transnational linkages amongst groups” and the activity of “cross-border interest groups” brought together by “economic interdependence”. Hence, the most important “movers and shakers” in regulatory politics are no longer domestic forces, but rather “actors that can coordinate their activities across borders”.​[34]​ But which groups have an incentive to mobilize on the resolution of cross border disputes and are better able to get organized across borders? 

The answer is given by two bodies of scholarly work: the literature on the international network structure of the financial industry and the literature on the power of the financial industry. Oatley et al.​[35]​ “map” the network structure of the international financial system on the basis of the “inbound” and “outbound” financial “ties” of each jurisdiction. Their work highlights a hierarchical network structure in which two countries - the US and to a lesser extent the UK - are the “hubs” to which other national financial systems are connected. Thus, European countries have strong financial ties with the US as well as other European countries (especially in the euro area),​[36]​ but they have few financial ties to countries in other parts of the world. In this respect, the UK has an intermediary role between the US and European financial centers, which often connect to the US via the UK, albeit Brexit is likely to alter this trend.​[37]​ This literature suggests that the financial industry is highly interconnected internationally and does business in multiple jurisdictions, especially in the two main hubs, namely, the US and the UK. Hence, the financial industry has major incentives to mobilize for the resolution of regulatory disputes that can hamper cross-border business, disrupting the network.





In this research, the dependent variable is the management of post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes in a system of polycentric governance centered on the Euro-American condominium. The antecedent variable are domestic regulatory reforms in the US and the EU, in particular the extra-territoriality of the new rules that originated the transatlantic disputes. The explanatory variable is the international network structure of the industry that accounts for the mobilization of the financial industry in the resolution of disputes that would disrupt cross-border business. The research is operationalized in three interconnected steps. Each empirical section first outlines the content of domestic regulatory reforms in the US and the EU, paying particular attention to the rules with extra-territorial effects. It also discusses the domestic regulatory process by focusing on the policy actors most involved in the disputes and their preferences. It then examines the international network structure of the industry in the financial sector directly affected by the dispute as well as industry mobilization with a view to resolving the dispute. Finally, the resolution of the dispute is examined. By considering disputes generated by i) EU regulation, ii) US regulation and iii) both EU and US regulation, it is possible to put forwards some generalizable explanations concerning transatlantic disputes.

Since the EU is a regional jurisdiction, the following sections examine the regulatory preferences not only of the EU authorities, first and foremost, the European Commission, but also those of the main member states, namely France, Germany and the UK. The UK is of particular interest for three main reasons. First, the making of EU financial regulation was often characterized by deep disagreements between the UK and Continental countries. Second, UK is part of the single financial market, hence it is subject to EU financial regulation (Brexit is likely to change this), but the UK opted out of the single currency (the euro) and is not a member of Banking Union. Thus, it is not part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the supervisory arm of Banking Union. Third, the UK sometimes took positions similar to those of the US in the transatlantic regulatory disputes examined in this paper because these jurisdictions are the hubs of the system and are highly interconnected with each other. Brexit is likely to increase the convergence of preferences between the US and the UK.

The European Central Bank (ECB) does not feature prominently in this paper because prior to the establishment of the SSM, which has the ECB at its center, the ECB was not responsible for banking supervision in the euro area. After 2014, the SSM and within it the ECB became responsible for banking supervision, but not regulation. Moreover, two of the three disputes discussed in this paper did not involve banking regulation. The European Supervisory Authorities, which were established post-crisis, were involved in some of the equivalence decisions prescribed by EU legislation at the center of the disputes (see Section 3).​[42]​ By contrast, the Congress sets the objectives of financial regulation, but regulatory agencies issue the enacting rules in the US.​[43]​ 

3 The EU directive on hedge funds and its “equivalence” rules

After the international financial crisis, the US and the EU adopted new rules for the regulation of hedge funds, which prior to the crisis were mainly subject to private sector governance.​[44]​ The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) introduced new legislation concerning the compulsory registration and minimal disclosure requirements for the “direct” regulation of hedge funds. However, funds mostly remained subject to “indirect” regulation. By contrast, post-crisis, the EU opted primarily for the direct regulation of hedge funds. The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs) (2011) introduced a legally binding supervisory regime for all AIFMs in the EU and set up a European passport for AIFMs. 

The main promoters of the AIFM directive were France and Germany, which prior to the crisis had called for the regulation of hedge funds.​[45]​ Post-crisis, French policy-makers argued that it was important for the EU to regulate hedge funds “without waiting for an international response…the EU can and must play  a central role in this field by rapidly taking bold initiatives”.​[46]​ Similarly, German policy-makers pointed out that “A European initiative would be an essential step to reach an international consent on the framework for hedge fund”.​[47]​ Amongst the member states, the main opponent of the directive on AIFMs was the UK, which hosts the majority of hedge fund managers in the EU. British policy-makers maintained that there was no evidence that hedge funds “contributed significantly to the global financial crisis” and that “many  of  the  risks posed  by  hedge  funds  are  also  posed  by  other  institutions…hence, regulatory interventions focused specifically on the sector are unlikely to be effective”.​[48]​ With reference to third countries, the highly contentious issues in the negotiations of the directive were the rules of access for non-EU AIFMs and non-EU Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) to the EU market. Particularly important was the treatment of non-EU AIFs because the majority of EU AIFMs manage AIFs based outside the EU. Hence, the transatlantic regulatory dispute mainly concerned the terms of access to the EU and the equivalence between EU and US rules – it was a case of extraterritorial territoriality.​[49]​ 

Without going too far into the technical details, French and German policy-makers wanted to make the terms of access to the EU market for non-EU AIFs and non-EU AIFMs more restrictive than the ones initially proposed by the European Commission. They argued that such an approach was necessary to prevent Europe from becoming “the Trojan horse for offshore funds”, as the French Treasury minister put it.​[50]​ The preferences of the UK, the US and the hedge fund industry were aligned: they sought a regime that allowed non-EU AIFMs and non-EU AIFs to operate across the EU provided that the jurisdiction in which they were based had “equivalent” regulatory standards, with a not very burdensome set of criteria to determine “equivalence”, such as complying with the standards on taxation issued by the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) recommendations against money laundering.​[51]​

UK policy-makers criticized the Franco-German approach to the treatment of third countries as “woefully short-sighted” and “bordering on a weak form of protectionism”.​[52]​ British policy-makers were very sensitive to the preferences of this sector of the financial industry​[53]​ because the UK hosts four-fifths of the AIFMs in the EU and many British AIFMs run funds based outside the EU for tax purposes. The main transnational association in this sector, the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) is based in London. The preferences of US policy-makers were similar to those of the UK and the hedge funds industry, which has a strong presence in the US.​[54]​ The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which is the US regulator for hedge funds, stated that it would be unlikely to be able to comply with the equivalence criteria suggested in the AIFMs draft directive, which would have closed the EU market to US-based funds.​[55]​ Timothy Geithner, the US Secretary of the Treasury, sent two letters to European policy-makers pointing out that the EU rules proposed would discriminate against US firms and deny them the access to the EU market that they currently have.​[56]​

The hedge fund industry has a hierarchical network structure: its hubs are the US and to a lesser extent the UK. Hedge fund assets under management are nearly $3.2 trillion, distributed as follows: 70 % in North America, 20% in Europe, 6% in Asia-Pacific, 2% in the rest of the world.​[57]​ Hedge fund managers are based 60% in North America, 20% in Europe, 17% in Asia-Pacific and 3% in the rest of the world. Moreover, this industry is very concentrated: the 100 largest hedge funds manage $1.4 trillion, or 61% of all assets under management.​[58]​ The AIMA has members in more than forty jurisdictions, with about 50% of members based in Europe. 

The hierarchical network structure of the hedge fund industry had two implications. To begin with, it gave the hedge fund industry a prime incentive to mobilize for the resolution of the dispute that could cause major disruptions to transatlantic business. Several AIFMs based in the US also did business in the EU. Most EU based AIFMs managed AIFs based outside the EU (mostly, in the US). As argued by AIMA, the directive, as initially drafted, “will have major consequences for non-EU funds and managers (particularly in North America and Asia-Pacific) who will face a major loss of business in the EU”.​[59]​ Moreover, the hedge fund industry was able to mobilize on both sides of the Atlantic, which increased its leverage. Hedge funds and their associations intensively lobbied British and US authorities for them to secure a revision of third-country provisions in the draft AIFM directive.​[60]​ The AIF industry also directly engaged with the EU authorities. As pointed out in the AIMA responses to the European Commission’s consultation, “[i]ll-thought out [EU] regulation will end up either harming the wider investment management industry or driving hedge funds out of the EU…”.​[61]​ In a subsequent paper, AIMA went as far as arguing that “the directive makes it so difficult and costly for non-EU funds and managers to access the EU market that it is clearly protectionist in effect, if not in intent”.​[62]​

In the final version of the directive, the third-country provisions were toned down, contradicting the preferences of the “continental coalition”, even though some constraints remained concerning the access to the EU market of non-EU AIFs and AIFMs.​[63]​ Non-EU AIFs could continue to be marketed in individual member states through the existing system of national, private placement regimes until the introduction of a “third-country passport”, which would enable the marketing of these services throughout the EU. Non-EU AIFs would be able to apply for the “EU passport” provided that appropriate supervisory co-operation arrangements were in place; the third country was not on FATF blacklist; and it complied with OECD tax agreements. A cooperation agreement between the EU and the US was signed in 2013. However, the extension of the passport to the US has so far been delayed following the advice of the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), which pointed out concerns for “investor protection, competition, market disruption and systemic risk”.​[64]​ 

4 The Volcker rule for banks and its implications for third countries

The international financial crisis highlighted the risk posed by financial institutions that are “too big, too complex, and too interconnected to fail” – these financial institutions are generally referred to as “too big to fail” or “systemically important financial institutions”. After the international financial crisis, the US and the UK adopted new rules on bank structure, whereas the EU has not yet done so and the proposed EU rules are rather “light”.​[65]​ The US and the UK adopted different domestic regulation to address this problem, namely the Volcker Rule in the US, which basically prohibited proprietary trading,​[66]​ and the “ring-fencing” of deposit-taking institutions in the UK.​[67]​ The differences between the domestic rules in the US and the UK explain why British policy-makers joined forces with those in Continental Europe in order to oppose the extraterritoriality of the Volcker Rule. 

The Volcker Rule, named after the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve who proposed it, prohibited federally-insured banks from engaging in proprietary trading of securities, derivatives, and other financial instruments.​[68]​ Proprietary trading is a high-risk form of trading, whereby the financial institution trades on its own account using its own capital and balance sheet, instead of acting on clients orders. Hence, the firm experiences the full profit or loss on positions. The crucial issue is to distinguish “proprietary trading” from trading for the benefits of clients, that is to say, “market-making”. Several exemptions – including market-making and risk-mitigating hedging – were to be defined by the regulatory agencies, which proposed “detailed” rules (300 pages) in late 2011.​[69]​ The Volcker Rule was strongly opposed by US banks. Indeed, the American Bankers Association initiated a legal challenge against the regulatory agencies (Wall Street Journal, 10 December 2013). The transatlantic regulatory dispute focused on the application of the Rule to foreign banks operating in the US and to their parent companies - it was a case of extraterritorial territoriality.​[70]​ Another contentious issue was the treatment of non-US sovereign debt because the initial version of the Rule exempted trades involving US Treasury bonds, but it did not give a similar treatment to debt issued by other governments. 

All the main European countries and their banks agreed on the need to limit the extraterritorial effects of the Volcker Rule. French policy-makers stressed that implementing the Volcker Rule “may have non-desirable, unhelpful and significant extraterritorial consequences for the non-resident banking entities”.​[71]​ Concern for the extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule was also expressed by the British Treasury Minister.​[72]​ In February 2012, Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner in charge of the single market, sent a letter to the chairman of the Federal Reserve arguing that the proposed US rule should focus only on trading activities that occurred in the United States.​[73]​ In the same month, policy-makers from France, Germany, Canada, Japan and other countries gathered in the UK’s embassy in Washington to coordinate their response to the Volcker Rule.​[74]​

European policy-makers were also worried about effects of the Volcker Rule for sovereign bond yields. As pointed out by French,​[75]​ British,​[76]​ and EU​[77]​ policy-makers, but also by European banks,​[78]​ the Rule could hinder the ability of US banks to buy and sell European sovereign bonds on behalf of customers, worsening the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.​[79]​ Michel Barnier argued that there should be either no exemption for US Treasury bonds, or the exemption should be widened.​[80]​ In turn, the position of US policy-makers is explained by the fact that the previous international capital accords, Basel I and Basel II, had allowed banks to assign a zero risk weight to exposures to all OECD sovereign debt, which was considered as risk-free. However, the building up of the sovereign debt crisis in the EU challenged this “optimistic” view and US policy-makers regarded only US treasury bills as a riskless asset. 

As pointed out by Oatley et al. (2013), the banking industry has a hierarchical network structure with two main hubs: the US and to a lesser extent the UK, which have strong reciprocal ties. This network structure gave the banking industry a major incentive to mobilize for the resolution of the dispute that could cause major disruptions to transatlantic business. All the main EU banks, first and foremost, UK banks, operated in the US and would thus be affected by the Volcker Rule. Furthermore, the banking industry was able to mobilize on both sides of the Atlantic against the Volcker Rule and its extraterritorial effects. Thus, banking associations and banks lobbied policy-makers in their jurisdiction (e.g. France, Germany, the UK) as well as policy-makers in the US. International banking associations were also active. The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) and the European Banking Federation (EBF) issued a joint response, arguing that the Volcker Rule “would create unintended negative effects inside and outside of the United States and inappropriately impose US regulation on the home country and other non-US activities of international banks”.​[81]​ The British Bankers” Association (BBA) criticized “narrow exemptions for activities conducted solely outside the US”.​[82]​ The German association of private banks (BDB) argued that the US authorities “should recognize home country regulation of non-US banks” and that the Volcker Rule was “much too extraterritorially burdensome for non-US banks”.​[83]​ 

In 2013, the dispute ran the risk of escalating because the European Commission was in the process of drafting the proposal for a “Regulation on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions” and threatened to retaliate against the proposed draft of the US Volcker Rule by exempting only sovereign bonds of European governments from the EU ban on proprietary trading.​[84]​ Eventually, the official draft regulation proposed by the European Commission in January 2014 included equivalence provisions, whereby foreign (including US) government debt could be exempted from the EU ban on proprietary trading if the European Commission adopted a delegated act to that effect. The proposed EU legislation (not agreed yet)​[85]​ also contained equivalence rules concerning its application to EU branches of foreign (including US) subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries of EU banks. 

The final version of the Volcker Rule was adopted in December 2013. With reference to third-country issues, there was a compromise, whereby non-US banks operating in the US were allowed to trade in the sovereigns bonds of their “home country”. Foreign banks whose trades were undertaken completely outside of the US were exempted from the Volcker Rule.​[86]​ US banks were exempted if they undertook trades through a foreign branch, as long as no personnel in American branches had any input in the trading decision. However, the outcome of the US presidential elections and the nomination of Steven Mnuchin as Treasury secretary casts doubt on the future of the Volcker Rule.​[87]​

5 The extraterritoriality of OTC derivatives regulation in the US and the EU

After the crisis, the US, and the EU adopted new domestic legislation on OTC derivatives. European Commissioner Charles McCreevy explicitly spoke of a “transatlantic consensus”​[88]​ on the matter. Thus, the regulatory dispute mainly concerned the extraterritoriality and mutual recognition of US and EU rules, not so much their content.​[89]​ 

The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) required that all standardized OTC derivatives be traded on an exchange or exchange-like platform and to be centrally cleared through an approved “derivatives clearing organization”. It required the establishment of repositories to store trading data. It also required that the new OTC derivatives rules should apply outside the US if those activities had a direct and significant connection with activities in the US. As with other parts of the Act, the implementing rules were to be set by regulators, namely the SEC for securities based derivatives (the smaller share of the market) and the  Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for all other OTC derivatives. In June 2012, the CFTC proposed interpretative guidance regarding the cross-border application of its rules,​[90]​ whereby non-US counterparties engaged in derivatives transactions with US persons would be subject to US registration and regulatory requirements.​[91]​ The draft contained a broad definition of “US persons” and only in a few cases did it permit “substituted compliance” with home country rules in lieu of compliance with US rules. 

Shortly afterward, in a letter to the Financial Times,​[92]​ Michel Barnier pointed out the “danger” that many of the CFTC requirements “would apply to companies in the EU and to trades between the EU and US clients. American rules would take primacy over those in Europe”. British policy-makers and the City of London were worried about the extraterritorial effects of the proposed CFTC rules; London is by far the largest center for OTC derivatives trading in the EU and one of the largest in the world, together with New York. Non-EU policy-makers were also unhappy about the proposed US rules. In April 2013, the European Commission and the treasury ministers of France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Switzerland, Brazil, Russia, Japan and South Africa sent a joint letter to the US Treasury seeking to persuade the US authorities that “regulators must work together to avoid outright conflicts in regulation and minimize overlaps as far as possible”.​[93]​

In 2011, the EU adopted new rules on OTC derivatives. The European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) established that OTC derivatives clearing was to take place through Central Counter Parties (CCPs) that should report their transactions to trade repositories.​[94]​ Clearing obligations applied not only to transactions between EU counterparties, or between one EU counterparty and one non-EU counterparty, but also to transactions between two entities established in one or more third countries that would be subject to the clearing obligation if they were established in the EU, provided that the contract had a direct substantial and foreseeable effect within the EU, or where such an obligation was necessary to prevent the evasion of any provisions of the EU legislation. This wording was a reaction to a similar wording in the Dodd-Frank Act, and, like the US rules discussed above, it had extraterritorial effects.​[95]​ 

The potentially wide scope of EU rules was mitigated by equivalence provisions intended to avoid duplicative or conflicting rules through equivalence. If one party to the transaction was established outside the EU and was subject to a regime declared “equivalent” to the regulatory framework set in place by EMIR, the party would have to comply with the EMIR clearing and reporting obligations. Equivalence rules concerned the terms of access of third countries’ CCPs and trade repositories that wanted to provide services to financial entities established in the EU. EU policy-makers wanted a similar “equivalence” mechanism to be inserted in US rules, but, as initially drafted, US rules did not envisage mechanisms for the recognition of third-country CCPs that wanted to operate in the US.​[96]​

In 2015, the global market for OTC derivatives was approximately $ 690 trillion, whereas exchange-traded futures and options were approximately $ 73 trillion.​[97]​ The transatlantic dispute on OTC derivatives regulation should be examined in the context of the power-struggle in the derivatives market. New York is the main center for the trading of OTC foreign exchange derivatives and credit default swaps. London is the main centre for the trading of OTC interest rate derivatives and OTC equity derivatives. The major derivatives exchanges are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, which also includes the New York Mercantile Exchange; the Intercontinental Exchange, which also includes the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, and Eurex in Germany. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange is by far the largest listed derivatives market, so any attempt to pull derivatives from OTC to exchange-traded would benefit the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The major CCPs are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in the US, the London Clearing House in the UK and Euroclear in Belgium. The mandatory use of CCPs for OTC derivatives would benefit the CCPs, especially the global ones. The main global dealers of OTC derivatives are thirteen wholesale investment banks, about half of which are European. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which is based in New York and has members from 67 countries, represents dealers of OTC derivatives, which were unhappy about the push toward listed derivatives.

The hierarchical network structure of derivatives market, which had two main hubs for clearing OTC derivatives, one in New York and one in London, meant that firms dealing with OTC derivatives did business both in the US and the UK (under EMIR rules). Therefore, the OTC derivative industry on both side of the Atlantic worried about and hence mobilized against the potential fragmentation of this global market as a consequence of different rules in the US and the EU. Particularly important were the effects of the extraterritoriality of those rules. The concerns of market-players were twofold: the duplication of costs of complying with two sets of rules, but above all the impossibility of doing so in the case of clearing: derivatives can only be cleared once, according to either US rules or EU rules. That poses an intractable problem if those rules are not compatible. The derivatives industry was most critical of the US proposed rules because they were those with stronger extraterritorial effects, but also because they were somewhat more burdensome than the EU rules. Indeed, the ISDA issued two letters in August 2012 criticising the broad definition of “US person” and pointing out that the substituted compliance described in the proposed guidance was “too particularized and prescriptive to succeed”.​[98]​ 

In July 2013, ISDA coordinated the writing of a joint letter with other seven transnational associations, namely the Global Financial Markets Association, the EBF, the AIMA, Futures and Options Association, Investment Management Association, Wholesale Market Brokers” Association and London Energy Brokers” Association.​[99]​ The letter, which was sent to Secretary Geithner and Commissioner Barnier, criticized the “extraterritorial effects” of EU and US regulation of derivatives as well as the potential dangers ensuing from insufficient transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Subsequently, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and the Institute of International Bankers filed a lawsuit against the CFTC for failing to “conduct legally required cost-benefit analysis” and imposing “rules” that were “contrary to international cooperation”.​[100]​ In July 2013, the European Commission and the CFTC agreed on a “Common Path Forward on Derivatives”,​[101]​ which was designed to allow firms to avoid the burden of complying with two different sets of regulations and reflected a compromise. The EU accepted that EU entities would have to register with the CFTC when they met applicable standards, while the CFTC accepted a greater degree of “substituted compliance” for entities to comply with EU requirements in lieu of CFTC rules. Firms trading swaps that were too complex or unique for a clearing house were free to choose which jurisdiction’s rules to apply. 

In February 2016, the CFTC and the Commission adopted a “Common approach for transatlantic CCPs”, whereby the European Commission agreed to adopt an equivalence decision with respect to CFTC rules, so that the ESMA would be allowed to recognize US CCPs. Once recognized, US CCPs could continue to provide services in the EU whilst complying primarily with US rules. In return, the CFTC agreed to adopt a determination of comparability with respect to EU requirements, which would permit EU CCPs to provide services in the US whilst complying primarily with EU.​[102]​ The European Commission’s equivalence decision and the CFTC’s determination of comparability decisions were taken in March 2016.​[103]​ 





Post-crisis transatlantic regulatory cooperation was successful in the vast majority of cases and built on the established patterns of pre-crisis international and bilateral cooperation. However, important disputes emerged concerning the regulation of hedge funds, banks and OTC derivatives. A comparative assessment across cases (see Table 1) reveals that these disputes were the consequence of different domestic regulatory reforms and the US and EU’s attempts to exert regulatory power beyond national borders through extraterritoriality and extraterritorial territoriality. In the case of the AIFM directive, the UK sided with US, hence the “trans-English-Channel” dispute was as serious as the Transatlantic one. However, British policy-makers sided with the rest of the EU in the other two disputes. After Brexit, this is unlikely to be the case in the future.

Table. 1. Post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes in finance and preferences of the main jurisdictions
Cases	AIFM directive	Volcker Rule	US-EU OTC derivatives regulation
Content of dispute	Extraterritorial territoriality (access to EU market)	Extraterritorial territoriality (access to US market) 	Extraterritoriality of US and EU regulation




In all the cases examined the resolution of transatlantic regulatory disputes was based on compromises: the US and the EU made concessions concerning the scope of direct and indirect extraterritoriality of domestic rules. Eventually, they agreed on mutual recognition/equivalence (which was the “legal formula” favoured by the EU) and substitute compliance (which was the terminology favoured by the US). The network structure of the financial industry had important effects on the management of transatlantic disputes. It meant that the financial industry that had an obvious sizeable stake in the resolution of the disputes because its businesses depended on cross-border flows. Thus, transnational alliances – what Cerny calls “transnational neopluralism”​[105]​ – were formed by the parts of the financial industry that were directly affected by patterns of substantive financial interdependence across the Atlantic. These alliances were able to orchestrate their lobbying in both jurisdictions to put pressure on domestic policy-makers to settle the disputes. 

Table 2. Preferences of the financial industry and outcome of post-crisis transatlantic regulatory disputes 
Cases	AIFM directive	Volcker Rule	US-EU OTC derivatives regulation
Preferences of the financial industry	Hedge fund industry: attempt to tone down EU directive; relaxed’ rules to access EU  	Banking industry: attempt to tone down Volcker Rule, limit extraterritoriality	OTC industry: attempt to tone down US rules; avoid market fragmentation and regulatory duplication 
Outcome of the dispute	EU rules made less penalising for non-EU managers/funds; equivalence and  recognition	US rules made less penalising for non-US banks and non-US sovereign debt 	US-EU agreement: mutual recognition and substitute compliance

 
As noted by Fahey in her article on “The Use of Law in Transatlantic Relations”, the cases examined in this article demonstrate “the use of law as a political tool” by both the EU and the US, partly to “protect the autonomy of their respective legal orders”,​[106]​ partly to “export” aspects of their legal order to other jurisdictions, partly to regulate cross-border activities that stem from the network structure of the financial industry. However, domestic regulatory reforms, especially those with extraterritorial effects, can generate regulatory clashes between jurisdictions in the polycentric governance of the international financial system. In turn, these clashes mobilize the financial industry in a variety of jurisdictions in order to resolve the disputes, often watering down rules. 

This research also highlights a “disjuncture” between the international network structure of the financial industry and the current (ineffective) polycentric governance of the international financial system. The international network structure of the financial industry would require either international (hard) rules jointly agreed by jurisdictions in international fora, or rules issued by the main financial center (namely the US) with extra territorial effects accepted by the other jurisdictions. Both these options are politically unfeasible. The result is weak polycentric governance that generates regulatory disputes (mostly due to overlapping rules) without necessarily filling regulatory gaps in dealing with financial risk.
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